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Aid and Growth: What Does the Record Show?
Does aid (understood as grants or loans provided by governments or multilateral public institutions to gov-
ernments or other entities in developing countries) promote economic growth?2
Interest in this question has grown as large infusions of aid to developing countries have been rec-
ommended in recent years as a means of promoting development (see e.g., Sachs 2005a, 2005b and Sachs 
and others, 2004 who argue that aid can be crucial in enabling countries to escape low-growth inducing 
“poverty traps”). Th   ere have also been major eﬀ  orts to mobilize resources for increases in aid on the part of 
developed country governments and international agencies (e.g. in the form of the eﬀ  ort to develop a new 
International Financing Facility). On the other side, critics of development aid argue that it has historically 
been ineﬀ  ectual in promoting growth and contend that increases in aid are therefore undesirable. An inter-
mediate position is that focused increases in aid can be desirable under speciﬁ  c conditions which ensure that 
aid is likely to succeed in promoting growth and development (such as when countries have in place “good 
policies”).
Is there a fact of the matter in regard to whether or not aid has promoted economic growth? Does 
the historical record permit inferences of this kind? Speciﬁ  cally, do comparisons over time and space of 
country-years in which aid was high to country-years in which aid was low demonstrate – when controlling 
for other possible determinants of growth – that greater economic growth has resulted (either contemporane-
ously or with a lag) when aid has been higher?
A number of studies have been presented in recent years attempting to answer the last question, 
using econometric techniques to analyze both cross-sectional and panel data on economic growth and aid 
(commitments or disbursements) in order to infer the relation between them. Th   ese studies include Burn-
side and Dollar (2000), Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004), Dalgard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), Easterly 
(2003), Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), Milanovic (2005), and Rajan and Subramanian (2005). 
Unfortunately, “the debate about aid eﬀ  ectiveness is one where little is settled” (Rajan, 2005).
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the eﬀ  ect of aid on growth by means of a cross-country 
causal analysis. We distinguish between “developmental” and “geopolitical” aid (deﬁ  ned further below) as 
1  We would like to oﬀ  er our sincere thanks to Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Subramanian for their exemplary openness 
and generosity in providing us with their data and in assisting us with queries concerning it. We would like to thank 
Rathin Roy and Jomo K.S. for their crucial encouragement and the Department of Economic and Social Aﬀ  airs of 
the United Nations for ﬁ  nancial support for this research. Th   e paper has beneﬁ  ted from helpful comments by Antoine 
Heuty, Jan Kregel and Francisco Rodriguez. We are grateful for assistance with data on the National Rainfall Index 
for developing countries from the Food and Agriculture Organization, Environment and Natural Resources Services 
(FAO-SDRN).
2  We recognize that it is controversial whether or not to identify loans speciﬁ  cally, and ﬁ  nancial transfers generally, as aid, 
because of the ethical presuppositions and ordinary language connotations of the term. However, we use it as we do 
here for linguistic convenience.2  DESA Working Paper No. 29
distinct aid categories which are likely to have distinct eﬀ  ects on per capita GDP growth. Th  e  speciﬁ  ca-
tions that we apply allow aid ﬂ  ows to translate into economic growth after long time periods. We ﬁ  nd that 
growth-enhancing, developmental aid has a positive, large and robustly signiﬁ  cant eﬀ  ect on growth, while 
geopolitical aid has a negative, robustly signiﬁ  cant eﬀ  ect on growth in some speciﬁ  cations, or is growth neu-
tral. We conclude that aid of the right kind is good for growth and that it translates into growth outcomes 
after long periods of time. In contrast, total aid (comprising geopolitical and developmental aid together) has 
no such eﬀ  ect.
Th   ese results carry potentially signiﬁ  cant implications for policy, as they entail that shifting the 
composition of aid in favour of developmental aid or increasing its quantity can lead to sizable long-term 
beneﬁ  ts. Th   e results may also help to resolve the so-called “macro-micro paradox” wherein aid is found to 
have average eﬀ  ects that are ‘roughly zero’ in macroeconomic studies but to have positive eﬀ  ects in micro-
economic studies such as project assessments (see e.g., Boone, 1994, and Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani, 
2004). From the perspective, we present in this study, a possible resolution is that whereas macroeconomic 
studies have been concerned with identifying the impact of aggregate aid, project assessments have focused 
speciﬁ  cally on projects with plausible developmental impact. As we shall see, macroeconomic studies of aid 
impact have also failed to be concerned with the impact of aid over long periods of time, as is necessary in 
order adequately to identify the eﬀ  ects of developmental aid in particular.
Th   e paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we discuss the problem of endogeneity of aid 
in growth regressions. In the following section, we highlight limitations of the strategy for addressing endo-
geneity which has been dominant in the recent empirical literature. Th   e next section discusses the problem 
of model misspeciﬁ  cation arising from overly aggregative views of aid in empirical assessments of the eﬀ  ect 
of aid on growth, and in the following two sections, we present our empirical results. Robustness checks are 
then included before we draw some conclusions.
The Problem of Endogeneity
A central issue bedevilling all of the studies mentioned above is that of endogeneity. Aid may aﬀ  ect growth 
but it is also entirely possible that the amount of aid received by a country in a given year is inﬂ  uenced by 
its present or expected future growth rates. If so, the causal eﬀ  ect of aid on growth may well be misestimated 
unless an eﬀ  ort is made to correct for possible endogeneity bias which results from such bi-directional causa-
tion. Th   e direction and magnitude of the endogeneity bias are not entirely obvious, however. It is plausible 
to imagine that a country may receive greater aid if it possesses lower growth (after controlling for initial 
income and other factors), as aid may be directed to such a country for humanitarian reasons, or because it 
is perceived that it “needs” supplemental resources due to its perceived inability to achieve the same growth 
rates as other countries through its available domestic savings or receipts of foreign direct investment. On the 
other hand, it is also plausible to imagine that the country may receive less aid if it possesses lower growth, as 
such a country may be viewed as being less credit worthy or as possessing expected performance that is less 
likely to place development agencies that provide aid to them in a positive future light.
It seems clearer that aid is likely to be endogenous to the level of income of a country than that it is 
likely to be endogenous to its level of economic growth. For example, greater aid may ﬂ  ow to countries that 
are perceived as more needy because they have lower incomes. Since the economic growth experienced by a 
country may be related to its level of income, economic aid may also be correlated with economic growth for Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  3
this derivative reason. However, including initial income as a control variable can deal with this derivative 
association between aid and growth.3
Th   ere are at least two plausible ways of dealing with the problem of the possible endogeneity of aid 
with respect to economic growth. Th  e  ﬁ  rst, which has been extensively explored in the literature, is to use 
instrumental variable analysis to attempt to isolate an exogenous source of variation in aid which is not at-
tributable to the level of economic growth experienced by a country, and to attempt to determine the impact 
on economic growth of variations in aid arising from this exogenous source. Various strategies have been 
adopted for this purpose.
A number of the choices of instrumental variables applied in this literature exploit the idea that aid 
may be given for geopolitical reasons, which are extraneous to the economic performance of a country (this 
is referred to as the “friends of the donors” class of variables by Easterly, 2003). Th   is idea has received per-
haps its most careful implementation in the widely publicized work of Rajan and Subramanian (2005) who 
estimate the level of aid likely to be received by a particular recipient country from a particular donor on 
the basis of geopolitical factors including whether or not the recipient country is a member of or a signatory 
to a strategic alliance, whether or not they have been a present or former colony of the donor, and whether 
or not the donor and the recipient share a common language. Th   ey then estimate the impact of aid receipts 
explained on the basis of these geopolitical factors on the level of growth experienced by the country. Th  ey 
ﬁ  nd little relationship between aid explained in this way and the level of growth experienced.
Similarly, Easterly (2005) draws instruments from the class of donor interest variables in an attempt 
to isolate the causal eﬀ  ect of repeated structural adjustment lending by the International Financial Institu-
tions on economic growth. Th   e author uses various instruments for aid that are intended to capture geopo-
litical inﬂ  uences. Th   ese include: volume of US military assistance to aid recipient countries, the size of the 
recipient countries measured by their population, dummy variables for Egypt and for oil producing coun-
tries (with which to reﬂ  ect the increase in US aid to these countries after the 1977 Camp David accord), a 
dummy variable for former French colonies, and the length of time spent under an IMF program during 
the 1970s. Th   e empirical estimations reveal no robust eﬀ  ect of repeated or lengthy multilateral lending on 
growth.
Th   e aforementioned papers build on the earlier work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Boone 
(1994, 1996) who use donor interest variables to address the endogeneity problem in relation to aid (Egypt 
and Franc Zone dummies, lagged volume of arms imports and population size). In a panel setting, Daalgard, 
Hansen and Tarp (2004) also include lagged aid as an instrument in a ﬁ  rst stage regression predicting exog-
enous variation in aid. Th   e rationale for using lagged aid as an instrument is that it is highly correlated with 
present aid and it acts as a proxy for country-speciﬁ  c determinants of the level of aid. Th   ese authors identify 
a positive eﬀ  ect of total aid on growth.
Th   e second method of dealing with the problem of the possible endogeneity of aid with respect to 
economic growth is to examine this eﬀ  ect over long periods of time, of suﬃ   cient duration to rule out any 
plausible conditioning of aid received on expectations of future economic growth. We do not know of any 
3  Once more, the sign of the eﬀ  ect is indeterminate. According to standard economic theory, poor countries are expected 
to grow more quickly as a result of possessing higher marginal returns to capital. However, this conclusion has been 
contested recently on both theoretical and empirical grounds (see e.g. Sachs and others, 2004). It is an empirical 
regularity that the least developed countries possess slower rates of growth of per capita income than do other countries 
(see e.g. Milanovic, 2005).4  DESA Working Paper No. 29
studies in the literature which have speciﬁ  cally adopted this approach to addressing the problem of endoge-
neity. We will discuss below our ﬁ  ndings when applying this approach.
Limitations of the Predominant Strategy for Addressing Endogeneity: Does Aid of 
Different Types Have Different Effects?
Th   e predominant strategy for addressing endogeneity in the literature has involved, as noted above, isolating 
the level of aid received by a particular recipient country that is explained on the basis of geopolitical fac-
tors. Th   e implicit premise of this instrumentation strategy is that the eﬀ  ects of aid on growth are the same 
regardless of whether that aid is received for geopolitical reasons or for other reasons. However, this premise 
is questionable.
For example, one can raise the question of whether aid (“geopolitical aid”) taking the form of gen-
eral budgetary support for an authoritarian regime that enables it to coerce its population to sustain political 
support from speciﬁ  c constituencies or to invest in infrastructure (such as roads between military bases) that 
facilitate military objectives is likely to have the same eﬀ  ect on growth as aid (“developmental aid”) taking 
the form of investments in irrigation, infrastructure (such as rural roads, bridges and ports) that helps to 
bring goods to market, or immunization campaigns, health clinics, schools and universities.4 If aid of diﬀ  er-
ent kinds indeed has diﬀ  erent eﬀ  ects, then this instrumentation strategy may lead to inferences concerning 
the impact of developmental aid which are quite incorrect, as discussed further below.5
For the purposes of this paper, developmental aid is understood as aid expended in a manner that 
can reasonably be anticipated to promote development (understood as improvements in human well-being, 
whether achieved through economic growth or other means). Geopolitical aid is deﬁ  ned as aid of all other 
kinds. Developmental aid is in practice presumed generally to be undergirded by a developmental motive 
and geopolitical aid is in practice presumed generally to be undergirded by other motives (perhaps promi-
nently including military and political considerations). It is important to note that these deﬁ  nitions place 
requirements on the nature of expenditures and on the impact that might reasonably be expected of these 
expenditures but neither on the motives underlying these expenditures nor on the ultimate eﬀ  ects that these 
expenditures eventually have. Both aid received due to geopolitical ties that is spent in a manner that might 
reasonably be anticipated to promote development and aid intended to promote development and spent in a 
manner that could reasonably be anticipated to promote development but which fails ultimately to do so are 
classiﬁ  ed as developmental aid according to the ‘expenditure side’ deﬁ  nition that we adopt.
In the identiﬁ  cation strategy we pursue below, however, we will make the empirical assumption that 
aid received for the reason that geopolitical ties exist between a donor and a recipient is also more likely to be 
geopolitical aid according to our deﬁ  nition (i.e. aid spent in a manner that cannot reasonably be anticipated 
to promote development). Of course, the contrast between expenditures that can be expected to promote 
4  It should be noted here that our premise in deﬁ  ning geopolitical aid is that aid received for geopolitical 
reasons is more often spent in a non-developmental way, on average, than is aid received for non-
geopolitical reasons. Th   is may not be true in individual cases. 
5 A  New York Times (February 6, 2006) editorial discusses the shares of “developmental” and “geopolitical” aid in the 
US foreign aid budget: “Economic aid for strategic allies and military aid make up more than half of the foreign aid 
budget. About 30 countries on the front line of the war on terror receive aid, mainly to buy their governments’ support. 
Development assistance is only 30 per cent of the budget, and a lot of that goes into projects undertaken in the name 
of promoting economic reform, democracy and good government.” Th   e same editorial goes on to argue that “Congress 
should pass a law mandating that a decent percentage of the foreign aid budget go to basic antipoverty eﬀ  orts”.Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  5
development and those that cannot be expected to do is not easy to draw without an exercise of judgment 
including the speciﬁ  cation of a threshold level of impact on developmental needs necessary in order to clas-
sify a particular kind of expenditure as developmental in nature. Th   is necessity is not an embarrassment but 
rather is in the very nature of classiﬁ  cation.
Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004) have independently noted the possibility that aid of diﬀ  er-
ent types may have diﬀ  erent eﬀ  ects on growth, although they do not make the distinction between develop-
mental aid and geopolitical aid and focus solely on the short-run impact of aid.6 Unlike Clemens, Radelet 
and Bhavnani (2004), we focus speciﬁ  cally on “developmental aid” as contrasted with “geopolitical aid” 
and on the eﬀ  ects of such aid over long time periods. In this way, we are able to respond directly to a central 
objection to that study, and to provide new evidence that aid of the right kind can have a robust and sizable 
impact on long-run economic growth.7
The Speciﬁ  cation Problem: Theoretical Results
In this section, we present analytical results identifying the bias in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) estimators of the eﬀ  ect of total aid on growth that can result from failing to 
take account of the possibility that diﬀ  erent kinds of aid may have diﬀ  erent eﬀ  ects on economic growth.
Th   e analytical derivations for the multivariate case are presented in full in Appendix 1. We repro-
duce here the main ﬁ  ndings. We posit that the true model is given by:
         ( 1 )
where gdenotes per capita income growth, DA stands for developmental aid, GA represents geopolitical aid, 
and C is a matrix of suitably identiﬁ  ed covariates. We suppose that the actually estimated model is given by: 
          ( 2 )
where TA represents total aid and is the sum of developmental aid and geopolitical aid.
6  Another study which assesses the inﬂ  uence of aid ﬂ  ows on growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa between 1970 and 
1997 is Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2002). Th   e authors use “adjusted” measures of (grant and total) aid from 
which they exclude food aid (which is assumed by the authors not to have a direct impact on growth) and technical 
cooperation (which is assumed by the authors to inﬂ  uence growth, but with a long time-lag). However, their 
speciﬁ  cations do not allow for a long-run eﬀ  ect of aid on growth, as “adjusted” aid is included in the speciﬁ  cations 
either contemporaneously or in one period (i.e., four years) lagged form. 
7  Rajan (2005) notes in relation to Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2004): 
Th   e study indeed shows that aid likely to have a short-term economic impact (for instance, aid used to build roads 
or support agriculture directly) is positively correlated with short-term growth. Here again, however, I’m not fully 
persuaded. Th   e authors of this study argue that the reason to focus on short-impact aid is because the literature focuses 
on country growth rates over four-year periods. So I presume it follows that if one were to depart from the literature 
and look at long-run growth (say growth over decades, which is what we really care about), economic aid (as contrasted 
with, say, humanitarian aid) cumulated during the period should have a discernible eﬀ  ect on growth (and there 
would be no need to separate out short-impact aid from long-impact aid). My work with Subramanian suggests that 
economic aid doesn’t have a robust positive correlation with long-run growth.
Th   e contrasting conclusion arrived at in this paper is precisely that “economic aid” has a robust positive impact on 
long-run growth.6  DESA Working Paper No. 29
As noted earlier, when estimating the marginal impact of total aid on growth, one can employ two 
strategies for dealing with the endogeneity problem. First, total aid can be included in cross-sectional regres-
sions in lagged form. Th   e motivation for such a speciﬁ  cation could be either that it is desired to assess the 
eﬀ  ect of past aid on present growth or that it is desired to assess the eﬀ  ect of present aid on present growth 
but to use lagged values of aid as explanatory variables for the reason that they are correlated with present aid 
but unlikely to be endogenous to present growth. In this case, it can be shown that the OLS estimator of the 
eﬀ  ect of total aid on growth is a weighted function of the true coeﬃ   cients on developmental and geopolitical 
aid, respectively. In particular, it is given by:
      ( 3 )
Th   e weights are functions of variances and covariances involving the values taken by the developmental, 
geopolitical and total aid variables conditional on the set of covariates (with this conditionality signiﬁ  ed by 
the tildes over the variables). It is easy to see from (3) that if the two categories of aid have opposite eﬀ  ects 
on growth but the model estimates the eﬀ  ect of total aid on growth, then OLS estimates of that eﬀ  ect can be 
zero.
Second, an instrumentation strategy can be employed. In this case, a proxy for geopolitical aid is 
ﬁ  rst predicted on the basis of a set of donor interest variables (as for example, in Rajan and Subramanian 
(2005)). Th   is proxy is then used as an instrument for total aid and a 2SLS estimation procedure is employed 
to estimate the eﬀ  ect of total aid on growth. We show in the Appendix that the 2SLS estimator of the eﬀ  ect 
of total aid on growth is also given by a weighted function of the true coeﬃ   cients on developmental and 
geopolitical aid:
      ( 4 )
Th   us, in either case, estimating the incorrect equation (2) instead of the correct equation (1) results in mis-
leading conclusions regarding the growth-eﬀ  ectiveness of aid. Th   e results described here help to explain how 
the recurrent ﬁ  nding that total aid has average eﬀ  ects that are “roughly zero” can be reconciled with the ﬁ  nd-
ings presented below – that developmental aid has robust and sizable positive eﬀ  ects while geopolitical aid is 
often found to have negative eﬀ  ects on long-term economic growth.
Empirical Findings (cross-section)
Th  e  Eﬀ  ects of Total Aid
We follow the methodology of Rajan and Subramanian (2005) and estimate a standard cross-country growth 
model which seeks to identify the eﬀ  ect of aid on growth. However, we allow for distinct categories of aid 
to have distinct eﬀ  ects on growth. We use aid data from the OECD-DAC database and GDP data from the 
World Development Indicators online (2006) for 107 countries between 1960 and 2000. All other variables 
are taken from the Rajan and Subramanian (2005) dataset which was made available to us by courtesy of the 
authors. Th   e variables and data sources are listed in Appendix 2.
Th   e relevant variables are averaged and the regressions are run over four diﬀ  erent time periods: 
1960-2000, 1970-2000, 1980-2000, and 1990-2000. Lagged values of aid of distinct types are used as 
explanatory variables. Averages over the relevant time periods are constructed only if data for all years within Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  7
a time period are available. Th   is restricts the number of observations to a minimum of 64 countries and a 
maximum of 77 countries in any given cross-sectional regression.8 Summary statistics for selected variables 
are reported in Appendix 3.9
We begin by replicating the baseline model used by Rajan and Subramanian (2005), namely one in 
which we estimate the eﬀ  ect of total aid on growth. In Appendix 4, the ﬁ  rst table includes the estimation re-
sults from running Rajan and Subramanian’s regressions and including the same lags of total aid as did they. 
We obtain the same results as Rajan and Subramanian. Th   ese reveal a persistent lack of explanatory power 
for economic growth for various lags of total aid.
We proceed to include more lags of total aid as explanatory variables for each time period over 
which the growth rate of the GDP we seek to explain. We do so for all time periods, but we fail to ﬁ  nd 
any signiﬁ  cant results for periods other than the 1990s. Th   erefore, we only show the regressions explaining 
growth in the 1990s, in Tables 4-2A and 4-2B. Th   e results are surprisingly robust and show that total aid 
lagged over diﬀ  erent time periods has explanatory power for average growth in the 1990s. In particular, the 
coeﬃ   cients on aid lagged over periods such as 1960-1970, 1960-1980 and 1960-1990 are as high as 8.5, 
suggesting that an increase of total aid during these periods by 1 per cent of GDP is associated with an aver-
age GDP per capita growth rate that is higher by approximately 0.085 percentage points in the 1990s.
Th  e  Eﬀ  ects of Aid of Diﬀ  erent Kinds
As shown later, coeﬃ   cient estimates on total aid may lead to erroneous conclusions as the true eﬀ  ect of the 
developmental, growth-enhancing components of total aid may be rather diﬀ  erent from that of compo-
nents of total aid (in particular, geopolitical aid) which may have no or a negative eﬀ  ect on growth. We now 
present empirical estimations in which we include suitable proxies for the developmental and geopolitical 
components of total aid. We estimate the following baseline model:
where the other covariates are precisely those included by Rajan and Subramanian (2005), namely: initial 
per capita income, initial level of life expectancy, institutional quality, geography, initial level of government 
consumption, an indicator of social unrest (revolutions), the growth rate of terms of trade and their standard 
deviation, initial level of policy (Sachs-Warner), and continent dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia).
Developmental aid is included as a regressor in lagged form, which means that its coeﬃ   cients can 
be interpreted as the eﬀ  ect of past developmental aid on current growth. Insofar as past developmental aid 
is correlated with present developmental aid, lagging the regressor can also be viewed as an alternative to 
instrumentation. Geopolitical aid is not included as a regressor in lagged form because it is by assumption 
largely exogenous to the economic performance of the country.10 Th   e estimate of its eﬀ  ect on growth will 
therefore be interpreted as the marginal eﬀ  ect of present geopolitical aid on present growth.
  8  However, all the empirical estimations presented in the paper are robust to also including countries for which 
incomplete data is available by constructing averages across available years. Th   ese results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
  9  Summary statistics for all covariates included in the regressions are presented in Rajan and Subramanian (2005).
10  Moreover, the variable is not available in the database in an averaged form over diﬀ  erent time periods. 8  DESA Working Paper No. 29
We consider the following ﬁ  ve distinct proxies for developmental aid: (1) multilateral aid (DA), (2) 
the sum total of bilateral aid from a group of Nordic countries comprised of: Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Iceland (G1), and (3) the sum total of bilateral aid from a larger group of countries com-
prised of: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Austria, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland (G2). Th   e fourth and ﬁ  fth proxies are based on the 2005 donor rankings produced by the 
“Commitment to Development Index” developed by Roodman (2006) (henceforth, ‘CDI’). Th   e index was 
developed with the aim of broadly assessing the performance of rich nations along various dimensions of 
policy, including aid trade, investment, migration, security, environment, and technology. Th   e ‘aid quality’ 
CDI ranks donor nations after adjusting their aid ﬁ  gures for the type of aid extended to recipient countries. 
In particular, the index penalizes donor countries which oﬀ  er tied rather than untied aid, loans rather than 
grants, and too many small aid projects which burden the recipient government. According to the 2005 ‘aid 
quality’ CDI rankings, the top ﬁ  ve nations were: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzer-
land. Th   ese constitute our G3 group. Th   e last proxy of developmental aid used includes bilateral aid from 
G3 and ﬁ  ve additional donor nations: Ireland, UK, Belgium, Finland and France (G4), which also score 
highest on the ‘aid quality’ CDI.
Th   e motivation for each of these possible proxies for developmental aid is respectively (1) the prem-
ise that multilateral aid (as distinguished from bilateral aid) is more likely to have a developmental rather 
than a geopolitical rationale and to be expended accordingly11, (2) the premise that the Nordic countries 
(G1) and selected additional countries (G2) are reputed to have aid programs oriented toward developmental 
aims (especially economic infrastructure, poverty eradication and social services) and (3) the premise that the 
groups of countries identiﬁ  ed (G3 and G4) as ranking highest in terms of ‘aid quality’ according to the CDI 
are likely to have a greater focus on developmental aims.
In Table 3-10, we report the contribution of bilateral aid from each group of donors to total aid and 
to total bilateral aid extended to developing countries over time. Net bilateral aid from the ﬁ  rst group of 
countries represented 4 per cent of total bilateral aid in the 1970s, 6 per cent in the 1980s and 7.2 per cent 
in the 1990s. It represented approximately 5 per cent of total aid allocated to aid recipients in the 1990s. Net 
bilateral aid from the second group of countries represented approximately slightly more than one tenth of 
total aid in the last two decades, and 11.5 per cent of bilateral aid in the 1970s, 15.7 per cent in the 1980s 
and 16.3 per cent in the 1990s. Th   e third group of donor countries accounted for higher shares of total aid 
and bilateral aid each decade than G1. Finally, ﬂ  ows from the G4 made up between 25.4 per cent (in the 
1980s) and 30.5 (in the 1990s) per cent of total bilateral aid to recipient countries and about one ﬁ  fth of 
total aid in the same decades. Two countries which belong to G4 but do not belong to G2 and account for a 
large share of aid are the UK and France: during the 1990s, the UK and France accounted for 12 per cent of 
all bilateral aid and 10 per cent of total aid extended to developing countries.
We consider the following two proxies for geopolitical aid: (1) aid predicted on the basis of past and 
present geopolitical ties (as reﬂ  ected by colonial relationships, a shared language, and common membership 
in an entente, alliance, or agreement). Th   is variable (henceforth, ‘RS-predicted GA’) is available in the Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005) database and has been constructed on the basis of an auxiliary, pre-ﬁ  rst stage re-
gression predicting bilateral aid with geopolitical dummy variables12; (2) Total aid minus the aforementioned 
11  Part 1 of the deﬁ  nition of multilateral aid provided in the OECD-DAC database reﬂ  ects this idea: “Multilateral 
transactions are those made to a recipient institution which conducts all or part of its activities in favor of 
development.”
12  For details on the regression model used to construct the geopolitical aid variable, see Rajan and Subramanian 
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proxies for developmental aid (namely, total aid minus multilateral aid, and total aid from which we subtract 
multilateral aid and DA-G1, DA-G2, DA-G3 and DA-G4, respectively). For reasons of space, and since the 
ﬁ  ndings are broadly invariant to the choice of proxy, in this paper we present cross-sectional estimations in-
volving the ﬁ  rst proxy for geopolitical aid.13 We also focus our attention on estimations which seek to explain 
the variation in GDP per capita growth rates over the periods 1980-2000 and 1990-2000 since the results 
for time periods beginning earlier (1960-2000 and 1970-2000) are not statistically signiﬁ  cant for a wide 
range of speciﬁ  cations (choices of lags). We are not perturbed by this ﬁ  nding since the lags feasible in these 
speciﬁ  cations are small (the dataset begins in 1960) restricting the ability to test our hypothesis that aid acts 
on growth with long lags for these earlier time periods.
Before proceeding with the empirical ﬁ  ndings, we discuss some data-related caveats. First, our 
speciﬁ  c choices of proxies for developmental aid and geopolitical aid have been constrained by several data 
limitations. For example, while the OECD-DAC database includes information on categories of aid such as 
development food aid, emergency aid and technical cooperation, the dataset for each aid category only goes 
back to 1975, 1995 and 1966, respectively. In contrast, multilateral and bilateral aid information is available 
for all years going back to 1960 and can serve as the basis for an analysis of the long-run impact of aid of the 
kind we are interested in.
A second matter to consider is the treatment of “debt forgiveness” in recording ODA. It is un-
clear whether “debt forgiveness” should be taken to be developmental or geopolitical in nature as it releases 
resources which may be used for diverse purposes. Further, the entire principal forgiven in a given year is 
counted as aid provided in that year in the OECD-DAC database. Th   is way of recording “debt forgiveness” 
makes it almost useless for our purpose since the bulk of the “aid” recorded as having been provided in a 
given year is notional in that year and its beneﬁ  ts will be distributed over many subsequent years. Neverthe-
less, it should be noted that the “total aid” variable in the database includes substantial debt relief extended 
to countries under the HIPC Debt Initiative during the last decade.
In Appendix 5, we present results from a ﬁ  rst set of estimations in which we employ multilateral aid 
as a proxy for developmental aid (Table 5A).14 Implicitly, in interpreting these results we make the assumption 
that bilateral aid is all geopolitical in nature, so that there are no omitted variables which may give rise to a 
bias in the coeﬃ   cient on multilateral aid (interpreted as developmental aid). We relax this assumption later.
We ﬁ nd that the coeﬃ   cients on both multilateral aid and geopolitical aid are statistically signiﬁ  cant 
and of large magnitude. As shown in Table 5A, an increase of 1 per cent of GDP in multilateral aid receipts 
in the 1960s is associated with an increase of half of a percentage point of the average growth rate of per cap-
13  However, the regressions that involve RS-predicted GA are consistent with those based on the second proxy for 
geopolitical aid (in which the additive identity between geopolitical aid, developmental aid and total aid holds) 
with the exception that the coeﬃ   cient on the GA proxy is statistically signiﬁ  cant in the ﬁ  rst case and is not in the 
second case. In Section VI, we use the second proxy of geopolitical aid. Furthermore, one consequence of using 
RS-predicted GA as a proxy for geopolitical aid that has been constructed via an auxiliary ﬁ  rst-step regression (Rajan 
and Subramanian, 2005: 9) is that the asymptotic t-statistics associated with all coeﬃ   cient estimates in the reported 
regressions are biased upwards if geopolitical aid has an impact on growth (Wooldridge, 2002: 116). It is notable, 
however, that if geopolitical aid is growth-neutral (its coeﬃ   cient is zero in the aid-growth equation) and if the variables 
used to predict it are exogenous to growth (which is indeed held to be the case by the proponents of instrumentation 
with donor interest variables), then the variance-covariance matrix of the OLS estimator is consistently estimated and 
statistical inference can be undertaken as usual (Pagan, 1984: 226; Wooldridge, 2002: 115-116). 
14  All cross-sectional regression results presented in this paper are robust to weighing the observations according to the 
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ita GDP in the 1990s. Similarly, an increase of 1 per cent of GDP in multilateral aid receipts in the 1970s 
is associated with GDP per capita growth in those countries two decades later that is higher by a quarter of 
a percentage point. Th   ese are sizable eﬀ  ects. We also ﬁ  nd that geopolitical aid is negatively and statistically 
signiﬁ  cantly associated with growth, although its marginal impact is much smaller. Increases in the share of 
geopolitical aid in GDP by 1 per cent over the period 1960-1980 are associated with average GDP per capita 
growth rates in the 1990s that are lower by 0.08 percentage points.
A possible reason for concern in interpreting these results is that some bilateral aid may be devel-
opmental in nature, but may have been omitted from our proxy for developmental aid in the regressions. 
Th   is may lead to challenges in interpreting the coeﬃ   cient estimates presented in Table 5A. To address this 
concern, we proceed to test variants of the baseline model which seek to identify the developmental (growth-
enhancing) components of total aid diﬀ  erently. Th   e results are presented in Tables 5B to 5E. In these speci-
ﬁ  cations, we examine the possibility that the most growth-enhancing form of bilateral aid is that which 
comes from the donor countries belonging to Groups 1 to 4 (as deﬁ  ned above). In order to avoid an omitted 
variable bias, we allow for multilateral aid, which is also presumptively developmental in nature, to have a 
distinct eﬀ  ect on growth, and include it alongside bilateral aid in the speciﬁ  cations. As usual, geopolitical aid 
is proxied by a variable which reﬂ  ects variation in aid receipts explained by past colonial ties, current strate-
gic relationships, etc.
Th   e results are striking. First, we identify a positive eﬀ  ect of bilateral aid from Group 1 donors on 
growth, with coeﬃ   cients that are large in magnitude: average growth in 1980-2000 was higher by as much as 
1.02 percentage points for countries that received 1 additional per cent of GDP as aid transfers from Group 
1 donor countries in 1960-1975. Furthermore, a 1 per cent increase the ratio of developmental aid from 
Group 1 donor countries to GDP in the 1970s and 1980s, is found to be associated with average growth 
rates in the 1990s that have are higher by 0.7 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively. Th   ese impacts are very 
large - even massive. In addition, lagged multilateral aid continues to have a statistically signiﬁ  cant positive 
eﬀ  ect on average growth, and its beneﬁ  cial eﬀ  ects on income growth operate over long lags. However, its 
eﬀ  ectiveness as measured by its marginal impact on the average GDP growth rate is substantially lower (by a 
factor of two or three) than that of bilateral aid from Group 1 countries.
One reason for preferring the speciﬁ  cations shown in Table 5C over those from the Table 5B is the 
possibility that there exists omitted variable bias. Such bias may arise if some of the aid provided by unin-
cluded bilateral donors (e.g., belonging to G2 but not to G1) is correlated with the aid provided by members 
of G1 but not with geopolitical aid. If the eﬀ  ect of this omitted bilateral aid is positive, then the eﬀ  ects of 
this aid would lead to an over-estimation of the eﬀ  ect of developmental aid (DA-G1) on growth. Th  e  results 
shown in Table 5C for the larger group of donor countries are consistent with those in Table 5B, and the 
coeﬃ   cients are statistically signiﬁ  cant and of comparable magnitude. As in the previous regressions, contem-
poraneous geopolitical aid has a statistically signiﬁ  cant, negative eﬀ  ect on growth. In these regressions, an 
increase in geopolitical aid of 1 per cent of GDP in the 1990s is associated with average growth rates that are 
lower by between 0.06 and 0.09 percentage points in the same period.
Tables 5D and 5E report the regressions results where developmental aid is measured as total bilat-
eral aid from Groups 3 and 4 of countries (that ranked highest according to the ‘aid quality’ CDI). Although 
memberships of G1 and G3 diﬀ  er by two countries (the Netherlands and Switzerland belong to G3 while 
Iceland and Finland belong to G1) the magnitude of the coeﬃ   cients on net bilateral aid (and indeed, all 
regressors of interest) are very similar (Tables 5B versus Table 5D for the 1990s). Th   is is not the case when Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  11
comparing the growth-eﬀ  ectiveness of aid from G2 and G4, respectively (Tables 5C versus 5E for the 
1990s). In particular, it appears that the inclusion of the United Kingdom and France among the “develop-
ment-oriented” Group 4 of countries results in a lower coeﬃ   cient on developmental aid suggesting that aid 
from these countries is in fact less developmental in nature. While aid from Group 2 countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s contributes to increasing growth in the 1990s in developing countries by between 0.3 and 0.5 
percentage points, the same coeﬃ   cients for Group 4 countries are 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. Geopolitical aid, 
however, continues to be negatively associated with growth in all the reported speciﬁ  cations: an increase by 
1 percentage of GDP in geopolitical aid is contemporaneously associated with average growth in the 1990s 
lower by between 0.03 and 0.1 percentage points.
To illustrate the strength of the association between diﬀ  erent categories of aid and average growth, 
we present a set of partial scatterplots in Graphs 1-4 (Appendix 6). We restrict our attention to selected 
regressions. However we note that the partial scatterplots for all the regressions (which show statistically 
signiﬁ  cant relationships between diﬀ  erent lags of aid and average growth) are very similar due to the large 
correlation between aid receipts for diﬀ  erent time periods for a given country. Th   e partial scatterplots reveal 
strong correlations between the diﬀ  erent categories of lagged aid and current growth -- a result summarized 
in the regressions. We recognize that the cross-sectional regressions presented in this paper are not infallible; 
for example, a real concern is that some
time-invariant country characteristics might have been omitted and might lead to inconsistency of the OLS 
estimator if correlated with the level or nature of aid receipts. We address this concern in the next section by 
estimating the impact of aid on growth in a panel setting.
Empirical Findings (panel)
In this section, we seek to address the concern that omitted time-invariant country characteristics in the 
cross-sectional regressions, may be causing the coeﬃ   cients on various types of aid to be inconsistent. In par-
ticular, we estimate the baseline growth model using panel data containing eight ﬁ  ve-year averages between 
1960 and 2000 and the “system GMM” estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). We oﬀ  er below a 
justiﬁ  cation for this estimation strategy.
First, estimation of a diﬀ  erenced equation is necessary to ensure elimination of the ﬁ  xed eﬀ  ects. 
Second, instrumentation of endogenous variables is required so as to avoid dynamic panel bias. Th  ird,  the 
nature of the short panel (small sample) and the likely high level of persistence in the outcome variable (out-
put) need to be taken into account by employing an appropriate estimation strategy. An estimator available 
for purposes of estimating a dynamic panel model of the kind employed in this paper is 2SLS on the First-
Diﬀ  erenced equation as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), in which the instruments for the ﬁ  rst-dif-
ferenced variables are given by at least twice lagged levels of those variables. Th   e instruments are valid under 
the assumption that initial values of endogenous regressors are predetermined and that the original error of 
the model is not serially correlated.15 Th   e 2SLS estimator, however, is not eﬃ   cient in the presence of hetero-
skedasticity since it does not exploit the fact that the diﬀ  erenced error term is a ﬁ  rst order moving average.
Th   e asymptotically eﬃ   cient alternative estimator is the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM “diﬀ  er-
ence” estimator (for the equation in levels). In the context of estimation of empirical growth models, how-
ever, this estimator has been shown to perform poorly for several reasons: many speciﬁ  cations of output 
15  A variable is predetermined if its past and current values are uncorrelated with the current error of the model. 12  DESA Working Paper No. 29
dynamics are used on panel datasets whose time dimension is not rich enough to provide for highly relevant 
instruments. Th   e problem can be made worse by a highly persistent outcome variable (such as output). If the 
instruments used in the “diﬀ  erence” GMM estimator are weak, a large downward bias may plague the esti-
mates in the context of small samples (i.e., small number of time series observations) and statistical inference 
becomes problematic (as shown in Blundell and Bond, 1998).
A superior alternative to the “diﬀ  erence” GMM estimator has been shown to be the Blundell-Bond 
GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Th   is is the “system” GMM estimator. Its advantage lies in 
enriching the set of instruments for the diﬀ  erence equation (i.e., lagged levels) with instruments for the levels 
equation (i.e., lagged ﬁ  rst diﬀ  erences), hence attenuating the weak instruments problem. Th  e  restrictions 
needed for the “system” GMM estimator to perform well involve initial conditions. It is desirable that the 
initial conditions perform well as instruments even if the outcome variable (output) is highly persistent. Th  is 
can be investigating using standard tests of over-identifying-restrictions (which we report with all subsequent 
panel regressions). Simulation studies by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer 
(2000) show that the “system” GMM estimator outperforms in terms of bias and precision the “diﬀ  erence” 
GMM estimator.
We therefore proceed to include in the paper estimation output based solely on the “system” GMM 
estimator. In all reported regressions, we implement a small sample correction suggested by Windmeijer 
(2005) since our sample size shrinks as higher lags of aid are introduced as regressors. To assess the valid-
ity of the instrument set, the p-value for the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is reported after 
each speciﬁ  cation. Following Rajan and Subramanian (2005), we treat as endogenous, and instrument for, 
the following regressors: beginning-of-period income level, inﬂ  ation, Sachs-Warner policy indicator, and 
government consumption. We treat as contemporaneously uncorrelated with growth the following regres-
sors: institutional quality and revolutions. We treat as strictly exogenous and use as an additional instrument 
the geography variable. An East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa regional dummy, as well as time dummies are 
included in all speciﬁ  cations.
Our proxies for developmental aid are lagged at least two time periods and are taken to be uncor-
related with future shocks to the growth model, though there may exist contemporaneous feedback from 
the outcome variable onto contemporaneous developmental aid. Consistent with our conjecture about the 
mechanisms through which geopolitical aid is extended to countries and operates through growth, we allow 
geopolitical aid to have either a contemporaneous or lagged eﬀ  ect on growth. In the former case, if geopoliti-
cal aid contains developmental elements or otherwise aﬀ  ects subsequent growth rates, we instrument for it 
with as many lagged values and lagged ﬁ  rst diﬀ  erences as are available for “system” GMM estimation. In the 
latter case, geopolitical aid can be treated as strictly exogenous to growth (on the assumption that it is typi-
cally given to countries for reasons independent of their economic performance)16, or alternatively it can be 
treated as endogenous (and is instrumented for) if it is misidentiﬁ  ed by our proxy for it. For reasons of space, 
we only include here speciﬁ  cations in which geopolitical aid has been included in lagged form, but all other 
speciﬁ  cations give similar results.17
16  It should be noted here that donors may extend geopolitical aid to countries and still be sensitive to those countries’ 
growth performance. Th   at case, however, is dealt with via instrumentation of geopolitical aid in the “system” GMM 
procedure.
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In Appendix 7, we present regression results involving the four proxies for developmental aid con-
structed by summing up net bilateral aid across the four diﬀ  erent groups of development-oriented donors 
(G1 to G4). To avoid misspeciﬁ  cation, we always include the share of multilateral aid in GDP as a second 
proxy for developmental aid. Our proxy for geopolitical aid is total aid minus the sum of multilateral aid and 
aid from the group of “development-oriented” bilateral donors. Although we have experimented with vari-
ous lags and these were occasionally signiﬁ  cant, we only present results in which each aid category has been 
lagged ﬁ v e  time periods (i.e., twenty-ﬁ  ve years) as we would like to allow for as long a lag as possible given 
data limitations (for other lags, the coeﬃ   cients on developmental aid were not robustly signiﬁ  cant across 
donor groups). Speciﬁ  cations involving lags higher than ﬁ  ve were infeasible because of the short time dimen-
sion of our panel (eight time periods).
Our ﬁ  ndings (Tables 7A and 7B) show that the developmental component of aid has a positive, 
statistically signiﬁ  cant impact on growth decades later: in particular, a 1 per cent increase in developmental 
aid in GDP is associated with average growth that is higher by almost 0.5 percentage points 10 years later, 
and higher by between 0.98 and 1.75 percentage points 25 years later. In contrast, multilateral aid and geo-
political aid have no statistically discernable impact on growth. In all regressions, the p-values of the Hansen 
over-identifying restriction test indicate that the GMM instruments are valid.
Further reﬁ  nements and robustness checks
In this section, we seek to further reﬁ  ne our analysis and discuss additional results (some of which we 
selectively report in the paper). We focus on the following issues: ﬁ  rst, we construct an alternative, distinct 
and plausibly exogenous proxy for developmental aid. Second, we specify richer aid-growth speciﬁ  cations in 
order to test a series of hypotheses: namely, the hypothesis that low and lower middle income countries are 
more eﬀ  ective at translating developmental aid into economic growth, as well as the conjectures that aid is 
more eﬀ  ective in ‘better’ policy environments and that there are diminishing returns to aid.
Alternative proxies for developmental aid
We propose an alternative proxy for developmental aid by identifying a plausibly exogenous source of varia-
tion in the amount of ODA received by developing countries. We posit that the amount of developmental 
aid extended to recipient countries is related to the quality of the agricultural season in those countries. An 
indicator of the quality of the agricultural season, which is highly correlated with crop yields, is the National 
Rainfall Index (henceforth, ‘NRI’) developed by FAO-SDRN.18 Th   e index is deﬁ  ned for areas where water 
is limiting for agricultural production. It represents the national average of the total annual precipitation 
weighted by its long-term average and it is available for all developing countries in our sample between 1960 
and 2000.
We use the variation in NRI to predict the share of total aid in GDP received by developing coun-
tries by ﬁ  tting the share of total aid in GDP using one-period lagged NRI and a ﬁ  xed eﬀ  ects estimation 
procedure.19 We then construct our developmental aid proxy by averaging the ﬁ  tted values of the share of 
18 Th   e NRI data from FAO-SDRN is distinct from rainfall estimates used by Miguel (2004) and obtained from the 
FAOCLIM database (which ceased to be updated in the mid-1990s). In contrast, NRI data covers a broader span of 
countries and years. 
19  Notably, both the ﬁ  xed eﬀ  ects and the random eﬀ  ects estimation procedures yield the same coeﬃ   cient estimates on 
NRI. Since there are no country-speciﬁ  c time-invariant country features which are systematically correlated with the 
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total aid in GDP within each decade, and subsequently use this regressor in our cross-country OLS regres-
sions. Once again, we allow developmental aid to translate into growth outcomes over a long time-horizon. 
It is implicitly assumed in the second stage speciﬁ  cations that NRI does not have an independent eﬀ  ect on 
growth other than via its eﬀ  ect on aid transfers.20 Th   e regression used to construct the DA proxy as well as 
the growth regressions for the 1990s are reported Appendix 8.21
We ﬁ nd that our previously identiﬁ  ed statistically signiﬁ  cant and positive eﬀ  ect of developmental 
aid on growth is robust to using this alternative proxy.22 In particular, increasing the share of developmental 
aid by 1 per cent of GDP in any prior decade leads to GDP growth rates that are higher by roughly a quarter 
of a percentage point in the 1990s. However, in these speciﬁ  cations, our geopolitical aid proxy is no longer 
signiﬁ  cant, which may be indicative that the negative, statistically signiﬁ  cant relationship that we have previ-
ously uncovered is weak. Th  is  ﬁ  nding leaves open an alternative hypothesis concerning the geopolitical aid is 
on average growth-neutral.
Aid eﬀ  ectiveness and income threshold eﬀ  ects
In this section, we test whether the data is consistent with income threshold eﬀ  ects that may inﬂ  uence 
countries’ ability to transform productive capital into economic growth. According to the poverty trap model 
outlined in Sachs and others (2004), capital thresholds may be responsible for the inability of less developed 
countries to embark on a path of sustained economic growth when these are combined with low savings rates 
and high population growth. Th   e authors argue that a poverty trap inducing combination of low productivi-
ty capital, low savings rates and high population growth are the result of underlying structural causes (among 
which, high transport costs and small market size, low productivity agriculture, high disease burden, adverse 
geopolitics, and slow diﬀ  usion of technology from abroad).
Th   e hypothesis we seek to test is whether aid has greater eﬀ  ectiveness in low or lower-middle income 
countries. To do so, we include a series of interaction terms between income-group dummies and develop-
mental aid in our baseline speciﬁ  cations. We do not ﬁ  nd evidence in favour of this hypothesis and thus do 
not report our results further. Since a very large share of the countries in our 107 country sample are low and 
lower-middle income countries, we face a problem of high correlation between the development aid proxy 
and its interaction with the low- and/or lower-middle income country dummies. Notwithstanding this vari-
ance-inﬂ  ating problem, we ﬁ  nd that the interaction term is mostly insigniﬁ  cant regardless of the proxy we 
use for developmental aid; however, the coeﬃ   cient on developmental aid continues to be statistically signiﬁ  -
cant, large and positive.
Aid, diminishing returns, and of the policy environment
We also tested the widely cited conjecture that aid is more growth-eﬀ  ective in “better” policy environments 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000) as well as the hypothesis of diminishing marginal eﬃ   cacy of developmental 
20  We make this assumption based on approaches in the growth literature related to the inclusion of geographical 
variables which are considered to be determinants of growth (see, for example, Sala-i-Martin (1997) who only includes 
latitude, area, and continent dummies as geographical determinants of growth). 
21  For reasons of space, we only report in the paper the growth regressions for the period 1990-2000 although we obtain 
signiﬁ  cant (and qualitatively similar) results for the periods 1960-2000 as well as 1980-2000. Th   e full set of results is 
available from the authors upon request. 
22 Th   e standard error estimates are not corrected for the use of generated regressors (predicted DA and RS-ﬁ  tted GA), 
which requires that the threshold of signiﬁ  cance must be set at a higher level than is customary in all regressions shown 
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aid (see, for example, Collier and Dollar, 2002 and many subsequent aid-growth studies). Speciﬁ  cally, we 
added quadratic terms of aid in our baseline speciﬁ  cations. Th   e following alternative proxies were included 
as a proxy for the “quality” of the policy environment: the Sachs-Warner (1995) policy variable, the updated 
Sachs-Warner policy variable (Wacziarg and Welch, 2003), the World Bank CPIA ratings (used by Collier 
and Dollar, 2002), and a policy index representing the weighted average of budget surplus, inﬂ  ation and 
trade openness (constructed by Burnside and Collier, 2000).23 In regressions not reported here, we ﬁ  nd no 
evidence that that aid raises growth only in a “good” policy environment (as interpreted by these measures) 
regardless of the proxy we use for developmental aid.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have attempted to provide new evidence concerning the growth eﬀ  ectiveness of oﬃ   cial 
development assistance to developing countries. In particular, we have built upon the most comprehensive 
and careful estimates so far presented in the literature and re-estimated the causal relationship between aid 
and growth in a cross-section of aid recipients, allowing for diﬀ  erent categories of aid to have distinct, pos-
sibly opposed eﬀ  ects on growth. We have attempted to disentangle the eﬀ  ects of two components of aid: a 
developmental, growth-enhancing component, and a geopolitical, possibly growth-depressing component. 
Each of the two categories of aid has been measured via appropriately constructed proxies and using relevant 
instrumental variables. Our speciﬁ  cations allow for the eﬀ  ect of aid on economic growth to be identiﬁ  able 
after long time-lags (possibly involving several decades).
We ﬁ nd that developmental aid has a strong, robustly signiﬁ  cant and positive eﬀ  ect on growth. Th  e 
coeﬃ   cient estimates show a sizable marginal impact of developmental aid on growth: in cross-country regres-
sions, an increase in average bilateral aid from Nordic countries by 1 per cent of GDP during 1960-1985 is 
associated with average growth rates in the 1990s that are higher by an (enormous) 1.5 percentage points. 
Th  e  eﬀ  ect is slightly smaller, yet equally remarkable, when bilateral aid from a larger number of donor coun-
tries is used as a proxy for developmental aid. In addition, multilateral aid has a strong, positive impact on 
growth. We also ﬁ  nd that contemporaneous geopolitical aid is negatively correlated with growth. Countries 
which received 1 additional percentage of GDP in geopolitical aid have experienced average growth rates in 
the 1990s that are lower by between 0.06 and 0.09 percentage points. Panel regressions conﬁ  rm the cross-
sectional results: an increase in average bilateral aid from countries ranking highest according to the Com-
mitment to Development Index by 1 per cent of GDP is associated with average growth rates 25 years later 
that are higher by 1.75 percentage points. A similar increase in bilateral aid from Nordic countries is associ-
ated with growth rates that are higher by 0.5 percentage points ten years later.
Our main ﬁ  ndings concerning the growth-impact of developmental aid are robust to the choice 
among alternative proxies for this type of aid (including total aid as predicted by a rainfall index) and exclu-
sion of outliers. Furthermore, we ﬁ  nd no robust evidence in favour of the hypotheses that aid is more eﬀ  ec-
tive in lower income countries, that aid is more eﬀ  ective in “better” policy environments, and that there are 
diminishing returns to aid.
We conclude that, contrary to previous ﬁ  ndings in the literature, certain types of aid (developmental 
aid) have a strong, positive impact on growth. Estimating models in which all sources of aid are aggregated 
into one quantity and presumed to have the same impact on economic growth may give rise to biased esti-
23 Th   e latter was obtained from the online database associated with Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004).16  DESA Working Paper No. 29
mates and lead to erroneous assessments of the growth-promoting potential eﬀ  ects of aid. Th   is causal process 
appears to operate over several decades. Th   is is not surprising. Developmental aid may support investments 
in physical infrastructure, organizational development and human capabilities which bear fruits only over 
long periods (consider, for instance, the long-term impact of investment in child health, nutrition and 
schooling). We ﬁ  nd no evidence that aid is more eﬀ  ective in “good” policy environments, that aid is more 
eﬀ  ective in countries belonging to a particular income group, or that there are diminishing returns to aid.
Th   e results of this study give rise to important policy implications. A change in the composition 
of aid toward developmental aid, and an increase in its quantity can be expected to create sizable returns in 
the long-run. Th   e recent scepticism about aid based on cross-country studies of the impact of total aid on 
economic growth does not appear to be justiﬁ  ed. Th   ere is an urgent need for a re-evaluation of the lessons 
learned from studies of the impact of aid on growth, and for further research aimed at identifying the growth 
eﬀ  ects of distinct categories of aid over relevant time periods.Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  17
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Appendix 1A. Derivation of the bias in the OLS estimator of the effect of Total Aid 
on Growth when the model is mis-specified 
 
The hypothesized True model is:  12 TT DA GA C γ ββ δ ε = ++ +  (1) where:  
•   per capita income growth γ =  
•  DA = developmental aid, with associated coefficient  1 β  
•  GA = geopolitical aid, with associated coefficient  2 β , and  
•   matrix of suitable controls C =  with 
 vector of coefficients on controls. T δ =  
 
The Estimated model is:  RR TA C γ βδ ε =++  (2) where 
•  TA = total aid = DA + GA and ( | ) 0 R ET Aε =  (e.g., lagged values of TA 
are used).  
 
The OLS estimator of β  is given by 
1 [' ] ' CC TA M TA TA M γ
−  where  C M is the residual-
maker matrix and therefore  C M TA and  C M γ  are the residuals from the partialled-out 
regressions of TA and γ  on the set of controls. Given (1), the OLS estimator can be re-







[' ] ' [ ]
[' ] ' [' ] '




TC C C C T
TA M TA TA M DA GA C
TA M TA TA M DA TA M TA TA M GA
T AMT A T AMC T AMT A T AM











The last two terms are zero since  0 C MC =  and  0 CT M ε =  (given exogeneity of C).  
 
Using the fact that the residual-maker matrix is symmetric and idempotent, we can write:  
 
'' ' ( ) ' CC C C C T AMT A T AM MT A MT A MT A ==; the same relationship holds for DA and 
GA:  
'' ' ( ) ' CC C C C T A MD A T A M MD A MT AMD A == and  
'' ' ( ) ' CC C C C TA M GA TA M M GA M TA M GA == . Denote  j
C M TA TA = ,  j
C M DA DA = and 
j
C M GA GA =  to obtain  l j j j j j j j j 11
12 (') ' (') '
OLS
TA TA TA DA TA TA TA GA ββ β
−− =+.  
 





(, ) (, )
() ()
OLS Cov TA DA Cov TA GA
Var TA Var TA
ββ β =+ (1). Furthermore, by 




(, ) (, )
() ()
OLS P Cov TA DA Cov TA GA
Var TA Var TA
ββ β ⎯⎯ →+, which means 
that the OLS estimator converges to a weighted average of the true coefficients Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  19
 
identifying the effect of Developmental and Geopolitical aid, respectively, and the 
weights are (positive) functions of the variances and covariances involving the two 
components of aid.  
 
A test of the validity of the True Model is 12 β β = .  
 
 
Appendix 1B. Derivation of the bias in the 2SLS estimator of the effect of Total Aid 
on Growth when the model is mis-specified  
 
As before, the hypothesized True model is:  12 TT DA GA C γ ββ δ ε = ++ +  (1) where:  
 
•   per capita income growth γ =  
•  DA = developmental aid, with associated coefficient  1 β  
•  GA = geopolitical aid, with associated coefficient  2 β , and  
•   matrix of suitable controls C =  with 
 vector of coefficients on controls. T δ =  
 
The Estimated model is:  RR TA C γ βδ ε =++  (2) where 
•  TA = total aid = DA + GA and ( | ) 0 R ET Aε ≠  due to reversed causality. 
For this reason, an instrumentation strategy is employed whereby TA is 
instrumented for with GA. GA fulfils only two of the three requirements 
for a proper instrument: relevance and exogeneity. However, GA has a 
direct effect on growth; hence it belongs to the true model. 
 
β  is estimated through Two Stage Least Squares. The two stages are outlined below:  
 
1.  In the first stage, we obtain exogenous variation in the instrumented variable:  
1 TA GA C π δς =+ + , yielding  l 1 [' ] '
OLS
cc GA M GA GA M TA π
− =  and  m TA 
2.  in the second stage, we run the original regression replacing TA with the  m TA: 
m
RR TA C γ βδ ε =++ . The 2LS estimator is  l mm m
1
2 '' SLS cc TA M TA TA M β γ
−
⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  
 
By symmetry and idempotency of the residual-maker matrix, the first multiplicative 
term in the formula of  l
2SLS β  is given by  m m m m m m '' ' ( ) ' cc c c c TA M TA TA M M TA M TA M TA == . 
Given the first stage, we have: 
m ll l
11 cc cc c M TA M GA C M GA M C M GA πδπ δ π ⎡⎤ =+ = + = ⎣⎦ since 0 c MC= . Therefore, 
m m ll l
2
'' ' cc c c TA M TA M GA M GA GA M GA πππ ⎡⎤ == ⎣⎦ . The second multiplicative term is 
given by  m m ll '' ' ' ccc c c c TA M M TA M M GA M GA M γ γπ γ π γ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ == = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
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The 2SLS estimator becomes: 
 
l ll l []
1 21 1
2 ''' ' SLS cc c c GA M GA GA M GA M GA GA M β ππ γ π γ
− − − ⎡⎤ == ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 
 
Now, replace  l π  with its formula from the First Stage regression. First, note that:  
l []
1 1 1 1 [' ] ' ' ' cc cc GA M GA GA M TA GA M TA GA M GA π
− − − − ⎡⎤ == ⎣⎦  
Then,  l [ ] [ ] [ ]
111
2 '' '' '' SLS cc c c cc GA M TA GA M GA GA M GA GA M GA M TA GA M β γγ
−−−
==  
Using (1), we have that:  
l [ ] [ ]
1
2 12 '' SLS cc T T GA M TA GA M DA GA C β ββ δ ε
−
=+ + + =  [ ]
1
1 '' cc GA M TA GA M DA β
−
+ 
+  [ ] [ ]
11
2 '' '' cc cc T GA M TA GA M GA GA M TA GA M β ε
−−
+   
 
The last term is equal to zero since GA is exogenous. Thus,  
 
l
2SLS β = [ ]
1
1 '' cc GA M TA GA M DA β
−
 + [ ]
1
2 '' cc GA M TA GA M GA β
−
 (3)  
 
Factor out [ ]
1
' c GA M TA
−
to obtain:  l n j j n j j m j 1
2 12 (,) (,) () SLS Cov GA TA Cov DA GA Var GA ββ β
− ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦  
 
Finally, we obtain that the 2SLS estimator converges to a weighted average of the 
coefficients of developmental aid and geopolitical aid, with weights given by function of 











Cov DA GA Var GA
Cov GA TA Cov GA TA
ββ β
⎡ ⎤
⎯⎯ →+ ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
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Appendix 2. Variables and sources  
 
Variable   Source 
Multilateral aid, Bilateral aid, Bilateral aid broken down 
by donor [in 2003 million US$] (net, grants and loans) 
OECD-DAC database 
  
GA/GDP   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) or 
proxies constructed by the authors  
  
Nominal GDP used to construct proxies of DA/GDP and 
GA/GDP [in 2000 million US$]  
World Development Indicators 
(2006)  
  
Initial per capita income   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Initial level of life expectancy  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Institutional quality  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Geography   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Initial level of government consumption   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Revolutions   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Growth rate of terms of trade   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Standard deviation of terms of trade   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Initial “level of policy” (updated Sachs-Warner variable)  Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
World Bank CPIA ratings   Rajan and Subramanian (2005) 
  
Burnside and Dollar (2000) policy variable   Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004)
  
Sachs-Warner policy variable   Sachs-Warner (1995) 
  
National Rainfall Index   FAO, Environment and Natural 
Resources Service  
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Appendix 3. Selected summary statistics for Total Aid/GDP, Multilateral Aid/GDP, 
Bilateral Aid/GDP, proxies for Developmental Aid and Geopolitical Aid, and other 
variables used in the regressions  
 
Table 3-1. Total Aid/GDP (TA/GDP)  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
TA/GDP  1960-1970  67 0.0729  0.0935 0.0000  0.4364 
TA/GDP  1970-1980  67 0.0893  0.1087 0.0000  0.5701 
TA/GDP  1980-1990  87 0.1147  0.1598 0.0000  0.8916 
 
 
Table 3-2. Multilateral Aid/GDP (MA/GDP) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
MA/GDP  1960-1970  67 0.0096  0.0141  -0.0001 0.0677 
MA/GDP  1970-1980  76 0.0293  0.0395 0.0000 0.1715 
MA/GDP  1980-1990    87 0.0390  0.0647  -0.0001 0.3813 
 
 
Table 3-3. Bilateral Aid/GDP (BA/GDP)  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
MA/GDP  1960-1970  67 0.0096  0.0141  -0.0001 0.0677 
MA/GDP  1970-1980  76 0.0293  0.0395 0.0000 0.1715 
MA/GDP  1980-1990  87 0.0390  0.0647  -0.0001 0.3813 
 
 
Table 3-4. Aid from Bilateral Donors (Group 1)/GDP (DA-G1/GDP) 
Group 1:  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
DA-G1/GDP  1960-1970  67 0.0004  0.0012 0.0000 0.0064 
DA-G1/GDP 1970-1980  76 0.0041  0.0152 0.0000 0.1206 
DA-G1/GDP  1980-1990  87 0.0058  0.0174 0.0000 0.1260 
 
 
Table 3-5. Aid from Bilateral Donors (Group 2)/GDP (DA-G2/GDP) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
DA-G2/GDP  1960-1970  67 0.0016 0.0025 0.0000 0.0098 
DA-G2/GDP 1970-1980  76 0.0095 0.0223 0.0000 0.1719 
DA-G2/GDP  1980-1990  87 0.0139 0.0330 0.0000 0.2591 
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Table 3-6. Aid from Bilateral Donors (Group 3)/GDP (DA-G3/GDP) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
DA-G3/GDP 1960-1970  67 0.0009 0.0017  -0.0001 0.0070 
DA-G3/GDP 1970-1980  76 0.0066 0.0209 0.0000 0.1716 
DA-G3/GDP 1980-1990  87 0.0111 0.0310  -0.0001 0.2551 
 
 
Table 3-7. Aid from Bilateral Donors (Group 4)/GDP (DA-G4/GDP) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
DA-G4/GDP 1960-1970  67 0.0410 0.0820  -0.0002 0.3856 
DA-G4/GDP 1970-1980  76 0.0302 0.0431 0.0000 0.1924 
DA-G4/GDP 1980-1990  87 0.0328 0.0529 0.0000 0.3117 
 
 
Table 3-8. Geopolitical Aid/GDP  
Variable Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
       
RS-predicted  GA/GDP  1960-2000    107 0.1214 0.2688 0.0005 1.9194 
RS-predicted  GA/GDP  1970-2000    107 0.1065 0.2287 0.0004 1.5771 
RS-predicted  GA/GDP  1980-2000  107 0.1031 0.2188 0.0004 1.4053 
RS-predicted  GA/GDP  1990-2000    107 0.1016 0.2040 0.0003 1.3818 
 
 
Table 3-9. Other variables used in cross-sectional regressions (1960-2000 average) 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Average Annual Growth Rate of 
Per Capita GDP 
86 1.3825 1.7510  -3.3734 6.7943 
Initial Per Capita GDP  82  7.3858  0.6859  5.9442  8.9671 
Initial Level of Life Expectancy  97  48.8192  10.9880  31.6100  71.6800 
Institutional  Quality    88 0.5271 0.1234 0.2250 0.8590 
Geography    89 -0.4722  0.8306 -1.0400  1.7839 
Initial Government Consumption  107  17.0369  12.3362  1.3766  65.0415 
Revolutions  107 0.2243 0.2354 0.0000 1.4444 
Average: Terms of trade  107  112.0005  21.7761  66.6658  176.2134 
St dev: Terms of trade  107  23.8871  18.1735  0.0058  94.3235 
Initial Sachs-Warner policy   107  0.0187  0.1361  0.0000  1.0000 
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Table 3-10. Contribution of each group of donors to  
net total aid and bilateral aid, by decade 
Donor group  Decade   Share of 
Bilateral Aid
a 
Share of  
Total Aid 
1960s  0.7  0.6 
1970s  4.0  3.0 




1990s  7.2  5.0 
1960s 4.0  3.7 
1970s 11.5  8.8 




1990s 16.3  11.3 
1960s  1.8  1.7 
1970s  7.6  5.8 




1990s  11.7  8.1 
1960s 25.9  24.0 
1970s 25.4  19.4 




1990s 30.5  21.1 
 
 
                                                 
a All 107 countries that enter the regression analysis are used in these calculations.  Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  25
 
Appendix 4. The effect of Total Aid on Growth. Replication of the results in RS 
(2005) 
 
Table 4-1. Regressions including the same lags as RS.  
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP  
Period over which GDP 
growth is explained  
1960-2000 1960-1980 1970-2000 1980-2000 1990-2000 
Period over which TA/GDP is 
lagged  
1960-1970 1960-1970 1960-1980 1970-1980 1980-1990 
       
TA/GDP lagged   -0.16  -2.97  0.99  2.98  5.21** 
 [2.76]  [2.95]  [2.00]  [2.79]  [2.09] 
       
Observations  61 58 64 64 77 
R-squared 0.73  0.51  0.72  0.68  0.56 
Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           
Intercept and all controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown. 
.  
 
Table 4-2A. Regressions for growth in the 1990s, including different lags than RS.  
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which TA/GDP 
is lagged 
1960-1965 1960-1970 1960-1975 1960-1980 1960-1985 
       
TA/GDP lagged   3.9451  6.0646** 7.9111** 8.4490** 8.0199** 
  [3.7457] [2.8802] [3.2969] [3.3076] [3.3997] 
       
Observations  64 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.62  0.63  0.64  0.65 0.64 
 
Table 4-2B. 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which TA/GDP 
is lagged 
1960-1990 1970-1980 1970-1990 1980-1990 1990-2000   
       
TA/GDP lagged   8.2196** 6.7051** 6.7692** 5.2080** 8.6552*** 
  [3.5666] [2.8989] [2.7108] [2.0851]  [3.2080] 
       
Observations  64 64 70 77 84 
R-squared  0.64 0.64 0.61 0.56 0.54 
In both tables:  
Robust standard errors statistics in parentheses           
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Intercept and all controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown. 
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Appendix 5. The effect of Developmental and Geopolitical Aid on Growth in the 
1990s  
 
Table 5A. Developmental Aid = Multilateral Aid  
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which 
MA/GDP is lagged 
1965-1970 1960-1970 1960-1975 1960-1980 
      
Lagged MA/GDP   49.0541*** 58.9424**  57.2925*** 47.1262*** 
  [17.2589] [22.2058] [17.4080] [13.3617] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -5.8826  -4.8461  -7.3931** -8.6034** 
 [4.1722]  [4.2949]  [3.6465]  [3.6930] 
      
      
Observations  65 64 64 64 
R-squared  0.66 0.65 0.66 0.66 
  
 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which 
MA/GDP is lagged 
1960-1985 1960-1990    1970-1980 1970-1990 1980-1990 
       
Lagged MA/GDP   44.5292*** 39.9140*** 27.0409**  30.3269**  27.4650*** 
  [12.9242] [11.8151] [12.3445] [12.1674] [9.4152] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -9.9379*** -9.5007**  -1.8803  -4.6880* -6.8091*** 
  [3.6301]  [3.7378]  [2.3777]  [2.3884]  [2.5090] 
       
       
Observations  64 64 70 70 77 
R-squared  0.66 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.58 
 
In both tables:  
Robust standard errors statistics in parentheses           
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown. 
Intercept is included, but estimate not shown.  
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Table 5B. Developmental Aid = Aid from Bilateral Aid donors (Group G1) and Multilateral Aid  
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1980-2000  
Period over which 
MA/GDP and DA-
G1/GDP are lagged 
1960-1965  1960-1970 1960-1975 1960-1980 1970-1980 1980-1990 
         
Lagged DA-G1 /GDP  -468.9356  107.0161  102.8898** 76.0352**  27.5129**  11.1610 
 [1,252.1411]  [120.4497]  [46.8476] [30.7858] [11.1940] [8.7103] 
Lagged MA/GDP  19.4459  17.6002  15.8784  15.1552  8.4909  -3.5625 
 [28.1992]  [21.4851]  [19.0469]  [15.3419]  [9.0052]  [6.7655] 
RS  predicted  GA/GDP  1.1460  -0.1962 -0.9300 -1.9097 -1.2462 2.0157 
         
Observations  64  64 64 64 70 77 
R-squared  0.68  0.68 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.67 
 
 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which MA/GDP and 
DA-G1/GDP are lagged 
1960-1970  1960-1975 1960-1980 1960-1985 
       
       
Lagged DA-G1/GDP  483.4241***  259.8359*** 175.3491*** 159.8369*** 
  [166.4596]  [56.2828] [41.0479] [39.5655] 
Lagged MA/GDP  60.6419***  56.6145*** 46.4336*** 43.8606*** 
  [20.7534]  [16.2198] [10.9762] [10.4647] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -4.8363 -6.3518*  -8.2192**  -9.5503*** 
  [4.0390]  [3.3520]  [3.3150]  [3.2944] 
       
Observations  64  64 64 64 
R-squared  0.67  0.70 0.70 0.70 
 
 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which MA/GDP 
and DA-G1/GDP are lagged 
1960-1990 
Regression ** 
for Graph 2 
1970-1980 1970-1990 
Regression * 
for Graph 1 
1980-1990 
        
        
Lagged DA-G1/GDP  153.5850*** 67.3481***  66.6559***  51.2740*** 
  [42.4039] [15.9009]  [19.6409]  [14.7204] 
Lagged MA/GDP  41.6750*** 32.4045***  31.8847***  23.3927*** 
  [9.8209] [10.6050]  [10.2148] [8.3534] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -9.8350*** -7.1934***  -9.9309***  -9.2094*** 
  [3.3616]  [2.1513] [2.7349]  [2.0442] 
        
Observations 64  70  70  77 
R-squared 0.70  0.68  0.68  0.62 
In all tables: Robust standard errors statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown. Intercept is 
included, but estimate not shown.  
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Table 5C. Developmental Aid = Aid from Bilateral Aid donors (Group G2) and Multilateral Aid  
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1980-2000  
Period over which 
MA/GDP and DA-
G2/GDP are lagged 
1960-1965 1960-1970 1960-1975 1960-1980 1970-1980 1980-1990 
        
Lagged DA-G2 /GDP  75.2632  73.3206** 64.4445** 36.6862***  22.2288** 10.7207 
  [86.3186]  [34.3595] [25.0318] [12.7049] [8.7989]  [7.4477] 
Lagged MA/GDP  18.3097 12.6607 11.4163 6.1480  6.4870  -5.9784 
  [22.3178] [19.1394] [14.7901] [10.8164] [8.4297]  [7.8316] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -0.1459 -0.6427 -1.8809 -1.6288 -1.2341 1.9707 
  [3.4515] [4.0857] [4.3000] [4.8144] [1.4651] [1.5317] 
Observations  64 64 64 64 70 77 
R-squared  0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.67 
 
 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which MA/GDP 
and DA-G2/GDP are lagged 
1960-1970 
Regression *** for 
Graph 3 
1960-1975 1960-1980 1960-1985 
       
       
Lagged DA-G2/GDP  302.9843*  184.5499*** 142.7371*** 132.2320*** 
  [168.7915]  [45.1491] [31.6513] [31.0158] 
Lagged MA/GDP  64.2021***  48.2258*** 37.2588*** 32.4877*** 
  [20.9855] [15.1613]  [9.0320]  [8.3589] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -4.1913  -4.6837  -6.9700** -7.6081** 
 [4.0191]  [3.4861]  [3.3745]  [3.4728] 
       
Observations  64  64 64 64 
R-squared 0.69  0.72  0.73 0.73 
 
 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which MA/GDP 
and DA-G2/GDP are lagged 
1960-1990 1970-1980  1970-1990 
Regression **** 
for Graph 4 
1980-1990 
        
Lagged DA-G2/GDP  128.2503*** 51.6666*** 46.4950***  32.3331*** 
  [32.6178] [11.9024]  [13.5186]  [8.5654] 
Lagged MA/GDP  30.0364*** 27.9139***  26.9011***  19.4440** 
  [7.9370] [9.9807]  [9.4529]  [8.2715] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -7.4680** -6.7158***  -9.5508***  -9.0682*** 
  [3.4890]  [2.1699] [2.7968]  [2.1161] 
        
Observations 64  70  70  77 
R-squared 0.73  0.69  0.69  0.63 
In all tables: Robust standard errors  statistics  in  parentheses       
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
All controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown.  
Intercept is included, but estimate not shown.  Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  29
 
Table 5D. Developmental Aid = Aid from Bilateral Aid donors (Group G3) and Multilateral Aid  
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which MA/GDP and 
DA-G3/GDP are lagged 
1960-1970  1960-1975 1960-1980 1960-1985 
       
       
Lagged DA-G3/GDP  436.7097**  252.9732*** 175.8611*** 158.9654*** 
  [167.3219]  [59.2841] [41.2603] [41.6505] 
Lagged MA/GDP  63.8642***  53.8072*** 41.7909*** 37.1728*** 
  [19.8032]  [16.1435] [10.1866] [9.3893] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -4.5502  -6.0332* -7.8482**  -8.6495** 
 [3.8522]  [3.3313] [3.2705] [3.3098] 
       
Observations  64  64 64 64 
R-squared  0.69  0.71 0.72 0.72 
 
 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which MA/GDP 






        
        
Lagged DA-G3/GDP  157.7138*** 51.8566***  44.9139***  32.6445*** 
  [43.8141] [13.9669]  [14.3833]  [9.5678] 
Lagged MA/GDP  34.6060*** 31.0485***  29.3779***  21.0787** 
  [8.7127] [10.6226]  [10.0879] [8.4024] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -8.8729*** -7.4897***  -10.1117*** -9.7199*** 
  [3.2847] [2.5082]  [3.0000]  [2.1959] 
        
Observations 64  70  70  77 
R-squared 0.72  0.68  0.68  0.62 
In all tables: Robust standard errors statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown. Intercept is 
included, but estimate not shown.  30  DESA Working Paper No. 29
 
Table 5E. Developmental Aid = Aid from Bilateral Aid donors (Group G4) and Multilateral Aid  
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which MA/GDP and 
DA-G4/GDP are lagged 
1960-1970  1960-1975 1960-1980 1960-1985 
       
       
Lagged DA-G4/GDP  8.0934*** 9.4691***  11.9034***  13.8141** 
  [2.4717]  [3.4133] [4.0801] [5.3668] 
Lagged MA/GDP  56.4610***  49.4445*** 39.1540*** 32.9734** 
  [20.7385]  [18.0620] [12.7657] [12.9755] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -7.3960* -9.1146**  -10.1374**  -10.5772*** 
  [4.2203]  [3.8241] [3.8059] [3.6605] 
       
Observations  64  64 64 64 
R-squared  0.67  0.68 0.68 0.68 
 
 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which MA/GDP 






        
        
Lagged DA-G4/GDP  17.1864** 24.6365**  37.0269*** 29.4028*** 
  [6.4831] [9.6243]  [12.2681] [8.9823] 
Lagged MA/GDP  26.4530**  14.5696 7.8664  7.9007 
  [12.6686]  [13.5065] [14.1216]  [12.3310] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  -10.0707*** -3.1543* -5.7053***  -6.5966*** 
  [3.7461] [1.6900]  [1.6876]  [2.2401] 
        
Observations 64  70  70  77 
R-squared 0.68  0.65  0.66  0.61 
In all tables: Robust standard errors statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown. Intercept is 
included, but estimate not shown.  Development Aid and Economic Growth: A Positive Long-run relationship  31
 
Appendix 6. Partial scatterplots of Growth and Aid.  
 
Graph 1. Partial scatterplot of Growth and Multilateral Aid (Regression * in Table 5B)  
 













































residual from ma_gdp7090 given other predictors








Graph 2. Partial scatterplot of Growth and Developmental Aid from Group G1 donor 
countries (Regression ** in Table 5B)  
 













































residual from g1_gdp6090 given other predictors
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Graph 3. Partial scatterplot of Growth and Developmental Aid from Group G2 donor 
countries (Regression *** in Table 5C)  
 
 













































residual from g2_gdp6070 given other predictors








Graph 4. Partial scatterplot of Growth and Geopolitical Aid  
(Regression **** in Table 5C)  
 
 













































residual from FaN_gdp given other predictors
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Appendix 7. Panel regressions (“system” GMM) 
 
Table 7. Developmental Aid = Aid from Bilateral Aid donors (Group G1, G2, G3 and G4) and 
Multilateral Aid. Each category of aid is lagged five periods. 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP  
Developmental aid = Aid 
from bilateral donors in Æ 
Group G1   Group G2  Group G3  Group G4 
      
Lagged DA /GDP  175.11*** 98.65***  176.87*** 5.24 
  [59.03] [27.35] [54.73] [4.81] 
Lagged  MA/GDP  4.36  -6.27 -1.89 -0.48 
  [17.61] [19.03] [22.12] [15.33] 
Lagged GA/GDP
a  1.94 2.24 2.06 1.85 
 [4.53]  [5.19]  [4.37]  [6.62] 
      
      
      
Wald chi2 (14)  244.39  249.10  230.63  258.93 
p-value Wald test   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
      
p-value Hansen test of over 
identifying restrictions  
0.924 0.870 0.920    0.853 
      
Observations  196 196 196 196   
# of countries   71  71  71  71 
In the table above: Robust standard errors statistics in parentheses.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
All controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown.  
Intercept is included, but estimate not shown.  
 
 
                                                 
a Geopolitical aid (GA) is defined as the difference between Total aid (TA) and the sum between 
multilateral aid and bilateral aid from each group of donor countries (G1, G2, G3 and G4). 34  DESA Working Paper No. 29
 
Appendix 8. Alternative proxies for Developmental Aid.  
 
Table 8A. Predicting TA/GDP with the average National Rainfall Index  
Dependent variable: TA/GDP  
 Fixed  effects 
 
Random effects 
    
FAO-NRI lagged one period  -0.000022 -0.000019 
  (2.73)** (2.74)** 
    
Constant   0.123907  0.117987 
 (11.92)**  (8.33)** 
    
Observations 3438  3438 
# of countries   107  107 
R-squared 0.0171  0.0171 
T-statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
 
 
Table 8B. Aid-Growth regressions. Developmental Aid = TA/GDP predicted by the NRI  
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP 1990-2000  
Period over which predicted 
DA/GDP is lagged 
1960-1970  1960-1975 1960-1980 1960-1985 
       
       
Lagged predicted DA/GDP   24.3099**  23.4091* 22.7454* 23.5119* 
  [12.1672]  [11.7753] [11.7891] [11.8538] 
RS  predicted  GA/GDP  1.3991  1.3695 1.3565 1.3483 
  [1.7983]  [1.7963] [1.7985] [1.7951] 
       
Observations 84  84  84  84 
R-squared  0.50  0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
 
Dependent variable: Average Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita GDP, 1990-2000  
Period over which predicted 






        
        
Lagged predicted DA/GDP  23.4592** 21.3581*  23.0043*  24.5094** 
  [11.7596] [11.4885]  [11.5921]  [11.6949] 
RS predicted GA/GDP  1.3350  1.3257  1.3105  1.2927 
 [1.7923]  [1.7984]  [1.7900]  [1.7807] 
        
Observations 84  84  84  84 
R-squared 0.50  0.50  0.50 0.50 
In all tables: Robust standard errors statistics in parentheses.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
All controls as in RS (2005) are included, but coefficients not shown.  
Intercept is included, but estimate not shown.  